Mahan-Mackinder-Fuller-Hart

 

Mahan Summary :-

sea power as a product of-trade+Base+ Ship
11-Chola, 15-Zheng He, 18-Maratha-konhoji Angre
great highway”,“wide common, well-worn trade routes
listed six fundamental elements of sea power

G-geographical position
P-Phsical Formation
Extent of Territort
Size of population
Character of people
character of government

GTP-Population, People, Government

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783(1890
Kaiser Wilhelm II
United States as the geopolitical successor
“vigorous foreign policy”

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Alfred Thayer Mahan

https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-geopolitical-vision-of-alfred-thayer-mahan/

• renowned naval historian, strategist, and geopolitical theorist
• Beginning in 1890 and continuing for more than two decades, Mahan, from his perch at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, wrote twenty books and hundreds of articles in an effort to educate the American people and their leaders about the importance of history and geography to the study and practice of international relations.

 His understanding of the

• anarchical nature of international politics,
• the importance of geography to the global balance of power,
• the role of sea power in national security policy, and
• history’s ability to shed light on contemporary world politics remains relevant to the 21st century world.

Mahan,

• the son of the legendary West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan
• served in the Union Navy during the Civil War,
• hereafter served on numerous ships and at several naval stations until finding his permanent home at the Naval War College
• 1883, he authored his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters, a study of naval engagements in the Civil War.
• It was his second book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783(1890), however, that brought him national and international fame. The book, largely based on Mahan’s lectures at the Naval War College, became the “bible” for many navies around the world. Kaiser Wilhelm II reportedly ordered a copy of the book placed aboard every German warship.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (1890),

• reviewed the role of sea power in the emergence and growth of the British Empire
• Mahan argued that British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britain’s emergence as the world’s dominant military, political, and economic power.
• In the book’s first chapter, he described the sea as a “great highway” and “wide common” with “well-worn trade routes” over which men pass in all directions.
• He identified several narrow passages or strategic “chokepoints,” the control of which contributed to Great Britain’s command of the seas
• He famously listed six fundamental elements of sea power: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, size of population, character of the people, and character of government. Based largely on those factors, Mahan envisioned the United States as the geopolitical successor to the British Empire.

Eight years before the Spanish-American War resulted in the United States becoming a world power with overseas possessions, Mahan wrote an article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled “The United States Looking Outward,” (1890) in which he :-

• urged U.S. leaders to recognize that our security and interests were affected by the balance of power in Europe and Asia
• Mahan understood that the United States, like Great Britain, was geopolitically an island lying offshore the Eurasian landmass whose security could be threatened by a hostile power or alliance of powers that gained effective political control of the key power centers of Eurasia.
• He further understood that predominant Anglo-American sea power in its broadest sense was the key to ensuring the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia.
• He famously wrote in The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empirethat it was the navy of Great Britain (“those far distant storm-beaten ships”) that stood between Napoleon and the dominion of the world.

This was a profound geopolitical insight based on an understanding of the impact of geography on history. Mahan accurately envisioned the geopolitical struggles of the 20th and 21st centuries.

• In The Interest of America in International Conditions(1910), Mahan foresaw the then-emerging First World War and the underlying geopolitical conditions leading to the Second World War, recognizing that Germany’s central position in Europe, her unrivalled industrial and military might on the continent, and her quest for sea power posed a threat to Great Britain and ultimately the United States
• Mahan also grasped as early as 1901 the fundamental geopolitical realities of the Cold War that emerged from the ashes of the first two world wars.
• He also recognized the power potential of China and foresaw a time when the United States would need to be concerned with China’s rise
• recommended U.S. annexation of Hawaii as a necessary first step to exercise control of the North Pacific. If the United States failed to act, Mahan warned, “the vast mass of China . . . may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion.”
• Similarly, in The Problem of Asia, Mahan depicted a future struggle for power in the area of central Asia he called the “debatable and debated ground,” and identified the “immense latent force” of China as a potential geopolitical rival.

 

The 1890s were marked by social and economic unrest throughout the United States, which culminated in the onset of an economic depression between 1893 and 1894. The publication of Mahan’s books preceded much of the disorder associated with the 1890s, but his work resonated with many leading intellectuals and politicians concerned by the political and economic challenges of the period and the declining lack of economic opportunity on the American continent.

Mahan’s books complemented the work of one of his contemporaries, ProfessorFrederick Jackson Turner, who is best known for his seminal essay of 1893, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History. An American history professor at the University of Wisconsin, Turner postulated that westward migration across the North American continent and the country’s population growth had finally led to the “closing” of the American frontier, with profound social and economic consequences. While Turner did not explicitly argue for a shift towards commercial expansion overseas, he did note that calls for a “vigorous foreign policy” were signs that Americans were increasingly looking outside the continental United States in order to satiate their desire for new economic opportunities and markets.

Mahan was one of the foremost proponents of the “vigorous foreign policy” referred to by Turner.

• Mahan believed that the U.S. economy would soon be unable to absorb the massive amounts of industrial and commercial goods being produced domestically, and he argued that the United States should seek new markets abroad.
• What concerned Mahan most was ensuring that the U.S. Government could guarantee access to these new international markets.
• Securing such access would require three things: a merchant navy, which could carry American products to new markets across the “great highway” of the high seas; an American battleship navy to deter or destroy rival fleets; and a network of naval bases capable of providing fuel and supplies for the enlarged navy, and maintaining open lines of communications between the United States and its new markets.

Mahan’s emphasis upon the acquisition of naval bases was not completely new. Following the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward had attempted to expand the U.S. commercial presence in Asia by purchasing Alaska in 1867, and increasing American influence over Hawaii by concluding a reciprocity treaty that would bind the islands’ economy to that of the United States. Seward also attempted to purchase suitable Caribbean naval bases. Finally, he attempted to ratify a treaty with the Colombian Government that would allow the United States to build an isthmian canal through the province of Panama. In the wake of the Civil War, however, Congress became preoccupied with Reconstructionin the South, and the Senate rejected all of Seward’s efforts to create a network of American naval bases.

In the 1890s, Mahan’s ideas resonated with leading politicians, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, and Secretary of the Navy Herbert Tracy. After the outbreak of hostilities with Spain in May 1898, President William McKinley finally secured the annexation of Hawaii by means of joint resolution of Congress. Following the successful conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States gained control of territories that could serve as the coaling stations and naval bases that Mahan had discussed, such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Five years later, the United States obtained a perpetual lease for a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

 

How Asians Came to See the Seas and Naval Strategy Like the West

https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/how-asians-came-to-see-the-seas-and-naval-strategy-like-the-west/

The 21st century is witnessing a relatively new development in history: the rise of Asian blue-water navies and naval strategy.While Japan and the Ottoman Empire did develop a strategic sense of oceanic power in the 19th century, the rest of Asia is now beginning to catch up, as countries without much of a naval tradition such as India, China, and Iran have begun to understand that sea power is key to national influence, as Alfred T. Mahan pointed out.

This is not an argument that Asian states have no historical connection to the sea. Quite to the contrary, states in China, India, and elsewhere have long histories of oceanic trade, shipbuilding, and naval battles. Proof of a historical Asian involvement with the ocean:-

• The 11th century conquest of the Chola Empire,
• 15th century voyages of the Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He,
• the 18th century exploits of the Maratha naval commander Kanhoji Angre

What really separates pre-modern from contemporary Asian views on the ocean is that:-

• prior to modern times, the sea itself was not viewed as a strategic space, to be controlled, like land
• Instead, it was a conduit for ships that traded, ferried troops, or pirated. Blockades were few and far.
• As William J. Bernstein points out in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World, prior to the arrival of Europeans in the Indian Ocean, “none of [the Asian] nations projected naval power over the high seas….as long as merchants paid customs, provided local sultans with gifts, and kept pirates at bay, the Indian Ocean was, more or less, a mare liberum.
• The idea that any nation might seek to control all maritime traffic would have struck merchants and rulers alike as ludicrous.” We know this idea today as freedom of navigation, which is in many ways, the default pattern across Asia.

this was not the pattern in Europe, which since the times of the Greeks and Romans in the Mediterranean, saw things differently.

• They believed that the sea could be divided up and patrolled
• ideas which helped give European powers, including small countries like Portugal, quick mastery of the sea
• Within twenty years of discovering a passage to India, Portugal had seized important ports throughout the Indian Ocean as far away as Malacca because it used the sea strategically and not merely as a conduit for trade.
• The sea was always important for Europeans in a unique way. Of all the major regions in the world, Europe has the longest coastline
• Its coastline is punctuated with inlets and bays, and there are many options to develop new ways of projecting power over the seas

Early modern states in Asia during this time like the Safavid Empire in Persia, the Mughal Empire, and the Qing Empire:-

• barely developed navies and had to hire ships when they needed naval tasks accomplished
• When navies were established, they were almost always brown-water forces
• These land-oriented empires mostly saw their military threats coming from Central Asia, so their coastal territories were almost always acquired via land conquests and were passive recipients of trade rather than active zones of oceanic power projection.
• For example, this was the Persian attitude towards Hormozgan, the region on the Persian Gulf until the last century. Hormuz was frequently neglectedand allowed a degree of autonomy that amounted to near-independence or foreign domination.

today, Asian states have adopted European notions of territory and naval power, with greater enthusiasm for sovereignty than Western nations themselves.

• This includes the notion of territorial waters and control over portions of the seas
• a notion taken to an absurd extent through China’s claim of most of the South China Sea
• It is entirely because of the traditional Asian way of looking at the sea that there is a lack of clarity on the historical claims various countries have over parts of the sea, since in the past, no country thought to claim and exercise control of uninhabited islands and the sea lanes around them

It is ironic, though, that this way of conceiving of the ocean has little precedent in the strategic thought of Asian cultures, while on the other hand, the United States, the country defending freedom of navigation, a concept with historical precedent in Asia, is from the civilization that undermined this way of looking at the seas and naval power. The rise of the Chinese, Indian, and other Asian blue-water navies is an interesting and historically unprecedented development that will lead to important strategic implications.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, who defined sea power as a product of

• international trade and commerce,
• overseas bases, and
• merchant and naval shipping.
• Take note: the navy constitutes only half of one-third of Mahan’s triad of sea power.

Friedman mostly excludes the human factor from naval affairs, further narrowing his vision.

https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/the-real-source-of-american-power-its-rivers/

Sea power, then, isn’t just about battle on the high seas. History is replete with examples of riverine politics and warfare, from robber barons wringing tolls from traffic on the Rhine in the Middle Ages, to Western and Japanese gunboats plying the Yangtze during the imperial era, to U.S. operations along such waterways as the Mekong or the Shatt al-Arab in more recent times. Command of the high seas is one thing. Command of internal waters is a more intimate thing entirely

 

https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/dont-worry-about-chinas-string-of-pearls-yet/

https://www.britannica.com/topic/sea-power

Sir Halford Mackinder

Click to access 11_chapter%204.pdf

During the Second World War, the editor of Foreign Affairs asked the great British geopolitical thinker Sir Halford Mackinder to update his global worldview, which had been set forth largely in two works: his 1904 paper “The Geographical Pivot of History” and his 1919 book Democratic Ideals and Reality.

Mackinder, then 82, responded with “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” which appeared in the July 1943 issue of Foreign Affairs and constitutes his last published words on the global balance of power.

Scholars of Mackinder and his geopolitical conceptstoo often ignore or downplay the significance of “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace.” In that article,

• Mackinder not only updated his Heartland concept,
• but identified other geographical features, including the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Monsoon lands of India and China, which he predicted would play an important role in the future global balance of power.

In both 1904 and 1919, Mackinder :-

• identified the northern central core of the Eurasian landmass as the “pivot region” or “Heartland” of the world  from which a sufficiently armed and organized great power or alliance of powers could bid for global hegemony.
• In both works, he recounted the successive waves of nomadic pressure emerging from the Heartland against the settled regions of Europe and Asia.
• He warned that technology and relative population distribution might produce a Heartland-based land power that could gain effective political control of the Coastlands of Eurasia and construct a navy superior to the sea powers of Britain and the United States.

https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/halford-mackinders-last-view-of-the-round-world/

https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/is-china-bidding-for-the-heartland/

 

Geopolitics:-

Geopolitic theory & myanmar's strategic location from aungkokotoe

https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2005/journal_eng/cac-04/07.dakeng.shtml

http://slideplayer.com/slide/690480/

Mackinder– must see Wiki:-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History

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Continental doctrine of sea power

America’s Rethinking of Sea Power and Its Policy Impact

http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2017-07/27/content_39059508.htm

Sea power is the basic and decisive factor in traditional maritime security. It serves as a major pillar for the global hegemony of the United States, where the sea power theory was originated.

In the 21st century, influenced by globalization, scientific and technological innovation and the rapid rise of China’s maritime forces, a new debate over sea power and subsequently a new understanding of it has emerged in the United States, leading to adjustments of relevant strategies and policies, which will have far-reaching influences on the regional and international security situation.

People’s understanding of sea power has evolved with the trends of the times, as well as scientific and technological development.

The US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who formulated an influential concept of sea power

• believed that sea power was the product of naval strategy, with different strategies determining the characteristics of a navy.
• Only when a strong navy is matched with appropriate strategies can sea power be finally achieved
• It is generally believed that the sea power Mahan proposed has two aspects:in the narrow sense, to achieve control of the seas through various kinds of advantageous forces, in a broader sense, not only the military power to dominate the sea by force, but also other marine elements that are closely relevant to the maintenance of a country’s economic prosperity
• Mahan made a complete and systematic elaboration of sea power.he main contents are:
•  1. Command of the sea is the primary factor for dominating the world. Control of the oceans, especially control of major trade routes, is the primary factor contributing to the power and prosperity of a country.
• 2. Sea power consists of a convenient geographical location with access to major oceans, maritime logistics bases established in its own coastal ports, a modern merchant fleet, a strong navy, strongholds on main routes, and vast territory, population, resources and economic strength.
• 3. A strong navy plays the primary role in projecting national power, and is the ultimate expression of national strength. A country’s navy is a tool of state policy. Only with a strong navy, can a country prosper and maintain a dominant position in the international arena.
• 4. A navy’s strategic goal is to defeat the enemy fleet in a decisive battle to gain the command of the sea. The enemy’s ships and fleets, no matter when, are the ultimate targets to be attacked.[9] The victory of a war depends on defeating the enemy’s battle fleet. To this end, a powerful fleet must be built to destroy an enemy fleet or block it in its base, or realize both objectives.
• 5.The US Navy is the foundation of the United States’ hegemony. For the United States, a strong navy that can carry out battles in the Atlantic and the Pacific respectively at the same time must be established for it to achieve and maintain dominance of the world.
• Issues:-
• Mahan’s thought of concentrating forces to destroy the enemy fleet does not have universal guiding significance in a real war; Mahan paid most attention to traditional naval conflicts, and although he discussed non-war situations, neither did he touch upon the flexibility a modern navy needs to fulfill its many functions, such as disaster relief, naval contact and diplomacy, and combating crimes such as piracy that threaten maritime security, nor did he provide guidance for the role of modern technologies, such as missile defense and nuclear deterrence

Scholars after Mahan have viewed sea power from an increasingly broader perspective:-

• Charles W. Koburger:- sea power is the military capability to affect maritime affairs and to influence onshore affairs from the sea
• Sam J. Tangredi:– sum of the abilities to conduct international maritime business, utilize marine resources, project military force, and exert influence on onshore affairs from the sea by means of the navy

“In the 21st century, it is not enough to focus sea power only on the navy and naval forces, because the nature and scope of threats have changed. The extensive definition of sea power must include all factors of the relationship between the state and the sea.”

• Admiral Thomas H. Collins:- Former Commandant of the US Coast Guard pointed out that,:- “Sea power in the 21st century is the ability of a nation to use the seas safely, securely, fully, and wisely to achieve national objectives… 21st century maritime power speaks to nations’ needs beyond the purely military capabilities needed for warfighting. It includes for each of us the use of the seas — to preserve marine resources, to ensure the safe transit and passage of cargoes and people on its waters, to protect its maritime borders from intrusion, to uphold its maritime sovereignty, to rescue the distressed who ply the oceans in ships, and to prevent misuse of the oceans.”

“Sea power is a relative concept, and nearly all countries have a degree of sea power, only different in terms of degree.”

• David Gompert:- has argued that “Sea power is the product of economics, politics, technology, and geography: necessitated by economics, textured by politics, enabled by technology, and shaped by geography.
• From international economics comes the need to transit the oceans safely and predictably. From international politics come confrontations and hostilities that may prompt nations to interfere with other nations’ sea-borne trade, giving rise to the need for navies. Domestic politics allow naval officers, business interests, and politicians to advocate, machinate, and formulate the particulars of sea power. Technology, defined to include the skill and ingenuity of people, can determine the balance between offense and defense, as well as the capabilities that afford the greatest operational advantages. If technology is equally accessible, the amount of resources a nation commits to naval capabilities determines its sea power. Geography, while largely beyond the control of nations, can make them more or less vulnerable and more or less able to project sea power where needed.

Corbett’s strategic thoughts include:

1. Maritime strategy is an extension of land strategy, and serves the land strategy. Maritime strategic objectives should be set in line with national policy objectives. The nature of sea battle must be considered in the context of national policy. A navy cannot achieve total victory in a war alone; it must work closely with ground forces so they can jointly complete the political goals of a war. Given that people are living on land rather than in the sea, the final decisive battle must be carried out on land. A successful maritime strategy must attach importance to the relationship between ground forces and the navy. Only through proper balance and appropriate use of the two, can victory be obtained.

2. Limited war on the sea. To win a limited war, it is not necessary to completely destroy the enemy. Occupying and holding a sufficiently important limited strategic location can force the enemy to the negotiating table

3. Limited interference in an unlimited war. New technology and weapons enable the navy to achieve the purpose of command of the sea by limited means. Disturbing an enemy’s sea routes can affect the enemy’s economy, psychology and war potential at a smaller cost.

the maritime strategy of Mahan is mainly based on the strategic theory of Antoine Henri Jomini, while Corbett’s maritime strategy is based on the war theory of Carl von Clausewitz.

Mahan was writing at a the time when the United States was on the rise, so his naval theory emphasized competition, aiming to break the spheres of influence of old colonial powers

while Corbett was in the era when British maritime power reached its peak and his theory emphasized how to turn the navy into a weapon to attack colonies and traditional land powers.

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J.F.C.Fuller

Fuller was a vigorous, expressive, and opinionated writer of military history and of controversial predictions of the future of war, publishing On Future Warfare in 1928. Seeing his teachings largely vindicated by the Second World War, he published Machine Warfare: An Enquiry into the Influence of Mechanics on the Art of War in 1942.

The Foundations of the Science of War (1926)

Fuller is perhaps best known today for his “Nine Principles of War” which have formed the foundation of much of modern military theory since the 1930s, and which were originally derived from a convergence of Fuller’s mystical and military interests. The Nine Principles went through several iterations; Fuller stated that …the system evolved from six principles in 1912, rose to eight in 1915, to, virtually, nineteen in 1923, and then descended to nine in 1925… For example, notice how his analysis of General Ulysses S. Grant was presented in 1929.

The United States Army modified Fuller’s list and issued its first list of the principles of war in 1921, making it the basis of advanced training for officers into the 1990s, when it finally reconceptualized its training

The Nine Principles involve the uses of Force (combat power). They have been expressed in various ways, but Fuller’s 1925 arrangement is as follows:

1. Direction: What is the overall aim? Which objectives must be met to achieve the aim?
2. Concentration: Where will the commander focus the most effort?
3. Distribution: Where and how will the commander position their force?
4. Determination: The will to fight, the will to persevere, and the will to win must be maintained.
5. Surprise (Demoralisation of Force): The commander’s ability to veil their intentions while discovering those of their enemy. Properly executed Surprise unbalances the enemy – causing Demoralisation of Force.
6. Endurance: The force’s resistance to pressure. This is measured by the force’s ability to anticipate complications and threats. This is enhanced by planning on how best to avoid, overcome, or negate them and then properly educating and training the force in these methods.
7. Mobility: The commander’s ability to maneuver their force while outmaneuvering the enemy’s forces.
8. Offensive Action (Disorganisation of Force): The ability to gain and maintain the initiative in combat. Properly executed Offensive Action disrupts the enemy – causing Disorganisation of Force.
9. Security: The ability to protect the force from threats

Triads and Trichotomies

Cabalistic influences on his theories can be evidenced by his use of the “Law of Threes” throughout his work. Fuller didn’t believe the Principles stood alone as is thought today,^[16] but that they complemented and overlapped each other as part of a whole, forming the Law of Economy of Force

Organization of Force

These Principles were further grouped into the categories of Control (command / co-operation), Pressure (attack / activity) and Resistance (protection / stability). The Principles of Control guides the dual Principles of Pressure and of Resistance, which in turn create the Principles of Control.^[15]

• Principles of Control (1, 4, & 7): Direction, Determination, & Mobility.
• Principles of Pressure (2, 5, & 8): Concentration, Surprise, & Offensive Action.
• Principles of Resistance (3, 6, & 9): Distribution, Endurance, & Security.

The Unity of the Principles of War

They were also grouped into Cosmic (Spiritual), Mental (Mind / Thought / Reason), Moral (Soul / Sensations / Emotions), and Physical (Body / Musculature / Action) Spheres, in which two Principles (like the double-edged point of an arrowhead) combine to create or manifest a third, which in turn guides the first and second Principles (like the fletches on an arrow’s tail). Each Sphere leads to the creation of the next until it returns to the beginning and repeats the circular cycle with reassessments of the Object and Objective to redefine the uses of Force. The Cosmic Sphere is seen as outside the other three Spheres, like the Heavens are outside the Realm of Man. They influence it indirectly in ways that cannot be controlled by the commander, but they are a factor in the use of Force. Force resides in the center of the pattern, as all of these elements revolve around it.

• Cosmic Sphere: Goal (Object) & Desire (Objective) = Method (Economy of Force)
  • Goal is the overall purpose or aim of the mission (what Goals must the mission complete or achieve?).
  • Desire concerns the priority of the achievement or acquisition of the Goal (how important and essential is the Goal to the overall mission effort?).
  • Method is how the forces available will carry out the mission (How much of the mission’s force will be assigned – or are available – to accomplish the Goal?).
• Mental Sphere (1, 2, & 3): Reason (Direction) & Imagination (Concentration) = Will (Distribution)
• Moral Sphere (4, 5, & 6): Fear (Determination) & Morale (Surprise) = Courage (Endurance)
• Physical Sphere (7, 8, & 9): Attack (Offensive Action) & Protection (Security) = Movement (Mobility)

These Principles of War have been adopted and further refined by the military forces of several nations, most notably within NATO, and continue to be applied widely to modern strategic thinking. Recently they have also been applied to business tactics^[19] and hobby wargaming.^[20]

Armament and History (1945)

Fuller also developed the idea of the Constant Tactical Factor. This states that every improvement in warfare is checked by a counter-improvement, causing the advantage to shift back and forth between the offensive and the defensive. Fuller’s firsthand experience in the First World War saw a shift from the defensive power of the machine gun to the offensive power of the tank.

Liddell Hart:-

http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/CIE/Chapter15.htm

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Armoured Warfare:-

Armoured warfare, mechanised warfare or tank warfare is the use of armoured fighting vehicles in modern warfare. It is a major component of modern methods of war.

• The premise of armoured warfare rests on the ability of troops to penetrate conventional defensive lines through use of manoeuvre by armoured units.
• Much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units.
• Modern armoured warfare began during the First World War with the need to break the tactical, operational and strategic stalemates forced on commanders on the Western Front by the effectiveness of entrenched defensive infantry armed with machine guns—known as trench warfare. Under these conditions, any sort of advance was usually very slow and caused massive casualties.
• The development of the tank was motivated by the need to return manoeuvre to warfare, and the only practical way to do so was to provide caterpillar traction to (machine)guns allowing them to overcome trenches while at the same time offering them armour protection against small arms (rifle, machine gun) fire as they were moving.
• Tanks were first developed in Britain and France in 1915, as a way of navigating the barbed wire and other obstacles of no-man’s land while remaining protected from machine-gun fire.
•  In the Battle of Cambrai (1917) British tanks were more successful, and broke a German trenchline system, the Hindenburg Line.
• , World War I saw the first tank-versus-tank battle, during the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when a group of three German A7V tanks engaged a group of three British Mark IV tanksthey accidentally met.
• the tank’s main tasks were seen as crushing barbed wire and destroying machine-gun nests, facilitating the advance of foot soldiers.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_warfare

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg

The dominance of blitzkrieg lay with superior tactics, radio communication, training and air support of the Whermacht. Before World War II the German Army spent considerable time training armored forces. Many in the German High Command refused to be swayed by the younger officer corps, that deep attacks into the enemy rear was the wave of the future. Many conservative generals reasoned that; logistical problems would doom a deep thrust attack to failure. Prior to World War II, then Col. Heinz Guderian authored a book titled Auctung Panzer. Guderians brilliant theories expanded on the prior writings of British General Fuller and Liddell Hart. Most nations still clung to the old theory of tanks supporting infantry, rather than infantry supporting tanks. Guderians theories found acceptance with Hitler, who expanded the armor program into practice.

Even though, the French and British based their defense of France and the Low Countries on old military theories, their equipment in some cases was superior to the Germans. The Panzer I was considered a training tank, with halftrack armor protection and 2 machine guns. The Panzer II was a reconnaissance tank with little armor protection and a 20mm cannon. These two panzers were almost worthless in tank to tank duels with the Allies Char-1b, S-35 and Matlida tanks. The Panzer III, with heavier armor protection, and a 37mm anti-tank gun, was the Germans main battle tank. The heavier Panzer IV possessed similar amour protection as the Panzer III, but was designed as an infantry support tank. The Panzer IV possessed a 75mm low-velocity gun. The captured stock pile of Czech T-38s after the invasion of Czechoslovakia added a welcomed addition to most panzer divisions. Gen. Mansteins brilliant plan played into the Allied High Commands assumption that the main German attack would drive through the Low Countries. The Whermachts superior tactics and the Allies panic turned the German attack into a rout. World War II Tank Tanks Guderian German Hitler Panzer Allied Manstein French British Allies Blitzkrieg Military Armor Whermacht

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (German: [ɡuˈdeʀi̯an]; 17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954) was a German general (colonel-general from 1940) during World War II, the innovator and advocate of the “blitzkrieg” (lightning war) doctrine was noted for his success as a commander of Panzer units during the campaigns in Poland and France and for initial success in the Soviet Union.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian